CHAPTER FIVE: TREATIES
Pages 81-98

Introduction. No state in the entire history of international law has ever been heard to claim that treaties are not legally binding. Of course, some states have broken their treaties (Stalin noticed that Hitler broke the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union when the German army suddenly invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941). And some states have repudiated treaties entered into by a former government. But no state has ever disavowed the rule of pacta sunt servanda (i.e., the rule that treaties are binding). Why do you think this apparently remarkable historical fact is true? Don’t states always want to enhance their power? But consider: is a state’s power enhanced or is it diminished if it recognizes the binding force of treaties?

Many people who are unfamiliar with international law have regarded treaties simply as contracts between states. Of course, a treaty resembles a contract. But on occasion it can also represent a constitution (consider the Charter of the United Nations, which is of course a “treaty”) or a deed of property (e.g., a treaty settling boundaries between states) or a precondition to all future legal relationships (as in a Peace Treaty). If treaties are more than contracts, then how should they be interpreted? Are there rules of customary international law that govern the making, the modification, the interpretation, the abrogation, and the dissolution of treaties?

In 1980 a remarkable multilateral treaty entered into force. It is called the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, colloquially called the “Treaty on Treaties.” As of 1990, 159 states were parties to this treaty. Although the United States is conspicuous by its absence, the authoritativeness of the Treaty on Treaties is so great that the United States Department of State routinely refers to the Treaty on Treaties in its diplomatic correspondence with other states, and counsel for the United States in various World Court cases have cited the treaty’s provisions as authoritative. In short, the Treaty on Treaties has become the equivalent of a Uniform Code in the field of international law.

Accordingly, we will let the Treaty on Treaties be our guide as we journey through some of the fascinating aspects of treaty law. This Chapter will be organized as a set of questions. After each question will be a quotation of the pertinent sections of the Treaty on Treaties and, from time to time, other materials and citations to readings contained in the International Law Anthology.

QUESTION 1. Under the United States Constitution, a treaty signed by the President is ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Suppose the President signs a treaty and obtains a two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives. Has the United States ratified the treaty?

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Done at Vienna, May 23, 1969
8 I.L.M. 679 (1969)

Article 1.
The present Convention applies to treaties between States.

Article 26.
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

Article 27.
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.

Article 46.
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.

2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.

QUESTION 2. Does the word “treaty” have to be used to make a treaty valid under international law?

Article 2.

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) ‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation;
(b) ‘ratification’, ‘acceptance’, ‘approval’ and ‘accession’ mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty;
(c) ‘full powers’ means a document emanating from the competent authority of a State designating a person or persons to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty;
(d) ‘reservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State;
(e) ‘negotiating State’ means a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty;
(f) ‘contracting State’ means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force;
(g) ‘party’ means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force;
(h) ‘third State’ means a State not a party to the treaty;
(i) ‘international organization’ means an intergovernmental organization.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of any State.


QUESTION 3. Suppose a state wishes to make it appear that it has signed a treaty without in fact doing so. It sends an ambassador to the treaty conference but, unknown to the other delegates, the state has enacted a secret provision that the ambassador has no power to bind the state. The ambassador signs the treaty. Is the state bound?

Article 7.
1. A person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty if:
(a) he produces appropriate full powers; or
(b) it appears from the practice of the States concerned or from other circumstances that their intention was to consider that person as representing the State for such purposes and to dispense with full powers.
2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their State:
(a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty;
(b) heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting State and the State to which they are accredited;
(c) representatives accredited by States to an international conference or to an international organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty in that conference, organization or organ.

If the authority of a representative to express the consent of a State to be bound by a particular treaty has been made subject to a specific restriction, his omission to observe that restriction may not be invoked as invalidating the consent expressed by him unless the restriction was notified to the other negotiating States prior to his expressing such consent.

QUESTION 4. A “default rule” is generally understood as the rule applying to a contract if the parties do not specify their own rule. As you work your way through the various treaty provisions of the Treaty on Treaties, ask yourself whether a given Article of the Treaty is or is not a “default rule.” Could the articles you have just read, Article 7 and Article 47, possibly be “default rules” when they raise the question of credentials? Isn’t the question of credentials always prior to the question of who is the proper party to a treaty? Don’t we have to know the identity of the parties before we can have a default rule?

QUESTION 5. Is it possible for a treaty to take effect upon signing? Or must a treaty be ratified in order for it to be binding? What purpose is served by ratification?

Article 11.
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.

**Article 12.**
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its representative when:
   (a) the treaty provides that signature shall have that effect;
   (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that signature should have that effect; or
   (c) the intention of the State to give that effect to the signature appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.

**Article 13.**
The consent of States to be bound by a treaty constituted by instruments exchanged between them is expressed by that exchange when:
   (a) the instruments provide that their exchange shall have that effect; or
   (b) it is otherwise established that those States were agreed that the exchange of instruments should have that effect.

**Article 14.**
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when:
   (a) the treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification;
   (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification should be required;
   (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification; or
   (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.
2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or approval under conditions similar to those which apply to ratification.

**Article 15.**
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when:
   (a) the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession;
   (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; or
   (c) all the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession.

**Article 16.**
Unless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession establish the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty upon:
   (a) their exchange between the contracting States;
   (b) their deposit with the depositary; or
   (c) their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary, if so agreed.

**QUESTION 6. What is the legal effect of a treaty upon a State which has signed the treaty but not yet ratified it?**

**Article 18.**
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.

**QUESTION 7. Can a unilateral oral statement by a state official ever bind the state in the same way that a treaty binds the state?**

Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
(Norway v. Denmark)
Permanent Court of International Justice

What Denmark desired to obtain from Norway was that the latter should do nothing to obstruct the Danish plans in regard to Greenland. The declaration which the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave on July 22nd, 1919, on behalf of the Norwegian Government, was definitely affirmative: "I told the Danish Minister today that the
The Norwegian Government would not make any difficulty in the settlement of this question."

The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs.

Nuclear Tests Case
(Australia v. France)
International Court of Justice

It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers upon the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration.\(^2\) An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.

Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation, but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound—the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.

With regard to the question of form, it should be observed that this is not a domain in which international law imposes any special or strict requirements. Whether a statement is made orally or in writing makes no essential difference, for such statements made in particular circumstances may create commitments in international law, which does not require that they should be couched in written form. Thus the question of form is not decisive. As the Court said in its Judgment on the preliminary objections in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear:

Where, as is generally the case in international law, which places the principal emphasis on the intentions of the parties, the law prescribes no particular form, parties are free to choose what form they please provided their intention clearly results from it.


Of the statements by the French Government now before the Court, the most essential are clearly those made by the President of the Republic. There can be no doubt, in view of his functions, that his public communications or statements, oral or written, as Head of State, are in international relations acts of the French State. [The President announced the intention of the French Government effectively to terminate its nuclear tests in the South Pacific.] These statements...must be held to constitute an agreement of the State, having regard to their intention and to the circumstances in which they were made.

QUESTION 8. Most of the world's treaties—probably over 98% of them—are bilateral. There is no such thing as a "reservation" to a bilateral treaty, because the two parties either agree to specific treaty language or they don't. But multilateral treaties are different. A state may wish to sign a multilateral treaty but may not want to be bound by a particular article in that treaty. Or a state may wish to state affirmatively how it interprets various key provisions in the treaty. Well, that may be what a state wishes to do, but what if the other parties to the treaty don't like it? Can they exclude that state from becoming a party to the treaty? Should it depend on the nature of the reservation that the state wishes to make?

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Article 19.\(^3\)

A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Article 20.

1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.

2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.

3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.

4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise provides:
   (a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in force for those States;
   (b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State;
   (c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation.

5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.

Article 23.

1. A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation, and an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting States and other States entitled to become parties to the treaty.

2. If formulated when signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the reservation shall be considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation.

3. An express acceptance of, or an objection to, a reservation made previously to confirmation of the reservation does not itself require confirmation.

4. The withdrawal of a reservation or of an objection to a reservation must be formulated in writing.

QUESTION 9. What is the effect of a state's reservation on the other parties to the treaty? Suppose A, B, C, and D are the other parties, and R is the reserving state. Does R's reservation change the treaty relationship between R and A, R and B, R and C, or R and D? Does it change the treaty relationship between A and B? Between A and C? Between B and D?

Article 21.

1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23:
   (a) modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and
   (b) modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving State.

2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty inter se.

3. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.

QUESTION 10. As you have seen in Article 19 of the Treaty on Treaties, a reservation is invalid if it is "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty." Would you expect this language to give rise to heated litigation? Do you think courts would find this language acceptable as a limitation on reservations?

Reading Assignment: *International Law Anthology*, pp. 125-30, and the Genocide Convention and the Genocide Advisory Opinion, both of which follow:

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
U.N.T.S. No. 1021 (1951)
Article 1
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Article 2
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 3
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.

Article 4
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Article 5
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.

Article 6
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Article 7
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

Article 8
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.

Article 9
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

Article 10
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.

Article 11
The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid.

Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

Article 13
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a process-verbal and transmit a copy of it to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.

The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.

Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 14
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force.

It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.

Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 15
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

Article 16
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article 17
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article 11 of the following:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article 11;
(b) Notifications received in accordance with Article 12;
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with Article 13;
(d) Denunciations received in accordance with Article 14;
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article 15;
(f) Notifications received in accordance with Article 16.

Article 18
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations. A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.

Article 19
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.

Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
International Court of Justice
May 28, 1951
1951 I.C.J. 15
Advisory Opinion

Question I addressed to this Court by the General Assembly is framed in the following terms:

Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the Convention while still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others?

It is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent, and that consequently no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto. It is also a generally recognized principle that a multilateral convention is the result of an agreement freely concluded upon its clauses and that consequently none of the contracting parties is entitled to frustrate or impair, by means of unilateral
decisions or particular agreements, the purpose and raison d'etre of the convention. To this principle was linked the
notion of the integrity of the convention as adopted, a notion which in its traditional concept involved the
proposition that no reservation was valid unless it was accepted by all the contracting parties without exception, as
would have been the case if it had been stated during the negotiations.

This concept, which is directly inspired by the notion of contract, is of undisputed value as a principle. However, as regards the Genocide Convention, it is proper to refer to a variety of circumstances which would lead to
a more flexible application of this principle. Among these circumstances may be noted the clearly universal
classic of the United Nations under whose auspices the Convention was concluded, and the very wide degree of
participation envisaged by Article XI of the Convention. Extensive participation in conventions of this type has
already given rise to greater flexibility in the international practice concerning multilateral conventions. More
general resort to reservations, very great allowance made for tacit assent to reservations, the existence of practices
which go so far as to admit that the author of reservations which have been rejected by certain contracting parties is
nevertheless to be regarded as a party to the convention in relation to those contracting parties that have accepted the
reservations--all these factors are manifestations of a new need for flexibility in the operation of multilateral
conventions.

It must also be pointed out that although the Genocide Convention was finally approved unanimously, it is
nevertheless the result of a series of majority votes. The majority principle, while facilitating the conclusion of
multilateral conventions, may also make it necessary for certain States to make reservations. This observation is
confirmed by the great number of reservations which have been made of recent years to multilateral conventions. In
this state of international practice, it could certainly not be inferred from the absence of an article providing for
reservations in a multilateral convention that the contracting States are prohibited from making certain reservations.
Account should also be taken of the fact that the absence of such an article or even the decision not to insert such an
article can be explained by the desire not to invite a multiplicity of reservations. The character of a multilateral
convention, its purpose, provisions, mode of preparation and adoption, are factors which must be considered in
determining, in the absence of any express provision on the subject, the possibility of making reservations, as well as
their validity and effect.

The Court recognizes that an understanding was reached within the General Assembly on the faculty to make
reservations to the Genocide Convention and that it is permitted to conclude therefrom that States becoming parties
to the Convention gave their assent thereto. It must now determine what kind of reservations may be made and what
kind of objections may be taken to them.

The solution of these problems must be found in the special characteristics of the Genocide Convention. The
origins and character of that Convention, the objects pursued by the General Assembly and the contracting parties,
the relations which exist between the provisions of the Convention, inter se, and between those provisions and these
objects, furnish elements of interpretation of the will of the General Assembly and the parties. The origins of the
Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as 'a crime under
international law' involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the
conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit
and aims of the United Nations (Resolution 96 (I) of the General Assembly, December 11th 1946). The first
consequence arising from this conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. A second
consequence is the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required 'in
order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge' (Preamble to the Convention). The Genocide Convention
was therefore intended by the General Assembly and by the contracting parties to be definitely universal in scope. It
was in fact approved on December 9th, 1948, by a resolution which was unanimously adopted by fifty-six States.

The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The Convention was manifestly adopted for a
purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual
character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human
groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the
contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely,
the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'etre of the convention. Consequently, in a
convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance
of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide,
by virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its provisions. The foregoing
considerations, when applied to the question of reservations, and more particularly to the effects of objections to
reservations, lead to the following conclusions.

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The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the States which adopted it that as many States as possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles which are its basis. It is inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation should produce such a result. But even less could the contracting parties have intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favor of a vain desire to secure as many participants as possible. The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation. Any other view would lead either to the acceptance of reservations which frustrate the purposes which the General Assembly and the contracting parties had in mind, or to recognition that the parties to the Convention have the power of excluding from it the author of a reservation, even a minor one, which may be quite compatible with those purposes.

It has nevertheless been argued that any State entitled to become a party to the Genocide Convention may do so while making any reservation it chooses by virtue of its sovereignty. The Court cannot share this view. It is obvious that so extreme an application of the idea of State sovereignty could lead to a complete disregard of the object and purpose of the Convention.

On the other hand, it has been argued that there exists a rule of international law subjecting the effect of a reservation to the express or tacit assent of all the contracting parties. This theory rests essentially on a contractual conception of the absolute integrity of the convention as adopted. This view, however, cannot prevail if, having regard to the character of the convention, its purpose and its mode of adoption, it can be established that the parties intended to derogate from that rule by admitting the faculty to make reservations thereto.

It does not appear, moreover, that the conception of the absolute integrity of a convention has been transformed into a rule of international law. The considerable part which tacit assent has always played in estimating the effect which is to be given to reservations scarcely permits one to state that such a rule exists, determining with sufficient precision the effect of objections made to reservations. In fact, the examples of objections made to reservations appear to be too rare in international practice to have given rise to such a rule. It cannot be recognized that the report which was adopted on the subject by the Council of the League of Nations on June 17th, 1927, has had this effect. At best, the recommendation made on that date by the Council constitutes the point of departure of an administrative practice which, after being observed by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, imposed itself, so to speak, in the ordinary course of things on the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity of depositary of conventions concluded under the auspices of the League. But it cannot be concluded that the legal problem of the effect of objections to reservations has in this way been solved. The opinion of the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself is embodied in the following passage of his report of September 21st, 1950:

While it is universally recognized that the consent of the other governments concerned must be sought before they can be bound by the terms of a reservation, there has not been unanimity either as to the procedure to be followed by a depositary in obtaining the necessary consent or as to the legal effect of a State's objecting to a reservation.

It may, however, be asked whether the General Assembly of the United Nations, in approving the Genocide Convention, had in mind the practice according to which the Secretary-General, in exercising his functions as a depositary, did not regard a reservation as definitively accepted until it had been established that none of the other contracting States objected to it. If this were the case, it might be argued that the implied intention of the contracting parties was to make the effectiveness of any reservation to the Genocide Convention conditional on the assent of all the parties.

The Court does not consider that this view corresponds to reality. It must be pointed out, first of all, that the existence of an administrative practice does not in itself constitute a decisive factor in ascertaining what views the contracting States to the Genocide Convention may have had concerning the rights and duties resulting therefrom. It must also be pointed out that there existed among the American States members both of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, a different practice which goes so far as to permit a reserving State to become a party irrespective of the nature of the reservations or of the objections raised by other contracting States. The preparatory work of the Convention contains nothing to justify the statement that the contracting States implicitly had any definite practice in mind. Nor is there any such indication in the subsequent attitude of the contracting States: neither the reservations made by certain States nor the position adopted by other States towards those
reservations permit the conclusion that assent to one or the other of these practices had been given. Finally, it is not without interest to note, in view of the preference generally said to attach to an established practice, that the debate on reservations to multilateral treaties which took place in the Sixth Committee at the fifth session of the General Assembly reveals a profound divergence of views, some delegations being attached to the idea of the absolute integrity of the Convention, others favoring a more flexible practice which would bring about the participation of as many States as possible.

It results from the foregoing considerations that Question I, on account of its abstract character, cannot be given an absolute answer. The appraisal of a reservation and the effect of objections that might be made to it depend upon the particular circumstances of each individual case.

Having replied to Question I, the Court will now examine Question II, which is framed as follows:

If the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the reservation as between the reserving State and: (a) the parties which object to the reservation? (b) those which accept it?

The considerations which form the basis of the Court's reply to Question I are to a large extent equally applicable here. As has been pointed out above, each State which is a party to the Convention is entitled to appraise the validity of the reservation, and it exercises this right individually and from its own standpoint. As no State can be bound by a reservation to which it has not consented, it necessarily follows that each State objecting to it will or will not, on the basis of its individual appraisal within the limits of the criterion of the object and purpose stated above, consider the reserving State to be a party to the Convention. In the ordinary course of events, such a decision will only affect the relationship between the State making the reservation and the objecting State; on the other hand, as will be pointed out later, such a decision might aim at the complete exclusion from the Convention in a case where it was expressed by the adoption of a position on the jurisdictional plane.

The disadvantages which result from this possible divergence of views—which an article concerning the making of reservations could have obviated—are real; they are mitigated by the common duty of the contracting States to be guided in their judgment by the compatibility or incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention. It must clearly be assumed that the contracting States are desirous of preserving intact at least what is essential to the object of the Convention; should this desire be absent, it is quite clear that the Convention itself would be impaired both in its principle and in its application.

[It may be that a State, whilst not claiming that a reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, will nevertheless object to it, but that an understanding between that State and the reserving State will have the effect that the Convention will enter into force between them, except for the clauses affected by the reservation. Such being the situation, the task of the Secretary-General would be simplified and would be confined to receiving reservations and objections and notifying them.

QUESTION II. Are there good reasons to encourage a state to make reservations to human-rights treaties if otherwise that state would not ratify the treaty? Consider the multilateral Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which entered into force in 1981, with over 100 states having become party. Most of the text is reproduced below. When Egypt ratified the Convention in 1981, it made reservations to Articles 2, 9, and 16. In general, Egypt said that it would comply with these articles provided that its compliance does not run counter to the Islamic Shari'a law. In particular, with respect to Article 9, under the Shari'a, a child always acquires the nationality of its father and not of its mother. And with respect to Article 16, the Shari'a prescribes that a wife may obtain a divorce only by the approval of a judge in court, whereas a husband may legally divorce his wife simply by stating that he has divorced her. However, the apparent one-sidedness of the Shari'a law regarding divorce is counterbalanced, Egypt claims, by the Shari'a requirement that upon marriage the husband must pay bridal money to the wife and thereafter must support her out of his own funds, whereas she retains full rights over her property and is not obliged to spend anything on her maintenance.

Do you think that Egypt's reservations are compatible with the Women's Convention? Should Egypt be permitted to become party to the Women's Convention?

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981
19 ILM 33 (1980)

Article 1
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction,
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.

Article 2.
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:
   (a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
   (b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
   (c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination;
   (d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;
   (e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise;
   (f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
   (g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.

Article 3.
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.

Article 4.
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.
   2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.

Article 5.
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
   (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women;
   (b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases.

Article 6.
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.

Article 7.
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right:
   (a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies;
   (b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;
   (c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.

Article 8.
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with men and without any
Article 9.
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband.

2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.

Article 10.
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:

(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to studies and for the achievement of diplomas in educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas; this equality shall be ensured in preschool, general, technical, professional and higher technical education, as well as in all types of vocational training;

(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same quality;

(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programs and the adaptation of teaching methods;

(d) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants;

(e) The same opportunities for access to programs of continuing education including adult and functional literacy programs, particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest possible time, any gap in education existing between men and women;

(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organization of programs for girls and women who have left school prematurely;

(g) The same opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education;

(h) Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning.

Article 11.
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:

(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;

(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment;

(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training;

(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;

(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;

(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.

2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:

(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;

(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;

(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities;

(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended as necessary.

Article 12.
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.

Article 13.
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:
(a) The right to family benefits;
(b) The right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit;
(c) The right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life.

Article 14.
1. States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural women and the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their families, including their work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of this Convention to women in rural areas.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right:
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development planning at all levels;
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, counselling and services in family planning;
(c) To benefit directly from social security programs;
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, including that relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the benefit of all community and extension services, in order to increase their technical proficiency;
(e) To organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal access to economic opportunities through employment or self-employment;
(f) To participate in all community activities;
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement schemes;
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.

Article 15.
1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law.
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.
3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void.
4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile.

Article 16.
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent;
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have
access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights;

(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;

(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation;

(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration.

2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory.

Article 17.
[This and subsequent Articles establish a Committee of experts to receive annual reports from states party to the Convention regarding their progress in implementing the Convention.]

Article 23.
Nothing in this Convention shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women which may be contained: (a) In the legislation of a State Party; or (b) In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for that State.

Article 28.
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States the text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession.

2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted.

3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then inform all States thereof. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received.

Article 30.
The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

QUESTION 12. Now that you have worked out your answer to the preceding question, please read the following assigned article that discusses these issues. Does Anna Jenefsky's reasoning persuade you? On what issues might you disagree with her?


QUESTION 13. All treaties must be interpreted. Of the following three choices, which interpretive mode do you prefer?

(a) TEXTUAL: just read the words of the treaty and nothing else; interpret the words in the normal way you would interpret any text that you might read.

(b) CONTEXTUAL: read the words of the treaty in light of the meanings that the parties to the treaty, at the time the treaty was made, would have given to those words.

(c) INTENTIONAL: give effect to the intent of the parties by taking into account the negotiating history leading up to the treaty, what the parties were trying to accomplish, all the drafts of the treaty, and also the final agreed-upon language.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Article 31.
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
   (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
   (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
   (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Article 32.
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
   (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
   (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

Article 33.
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.

2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.

3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.

4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.


**QUESTION 14. In the interpretation of treaties, is there a presumption against the retroactivity of the treaty?**

Article 28.
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.5

**QUESTION 15. Please refer back to Question 4. Have you been keeping track of which provisions in the Treaty on Treaties operate as “default rules”? Are any of the following provisions in the Vienna Convention not default rules?**

Article 6
Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.

Article 26
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

Article 27
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for the failure to perform a treaty.6

Article 34
A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.

Article 53.
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted, and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Article 62
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent
of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.

3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

QUESTION 16. Article 53, which you have just read, talks about "peremptory norms." How can such norms be identified? Once identified, can they be modified?

**Assigned Reading:** *International Law Anthology*, pp. 115-19 (Debate on "Jus Cogens")

QUESTION 17. Treaties typically last a long time; often there is no provision for their termination. Yet things change, and what might have once seemed a favorable provision in a treaty can appear quite onerous years later. Do you think that a treaty should terminate automatically if there has been a fundamental change of circumstances?

**Article 62.**

[Text of Article 62 is given directly above.]

**Article 63.**

The severance of diplomatic or consular relations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations established between them by the treaty except in so far as the existence of diplomatic or consular relations is indispensable for the application of the treaty.

**Assigned Reading:** *International Law Anthology*, pp. 124-25.

QUESTION 18. The boundaries between many countries, in whole or in part, follow natural geographical configurations. Suppose two nations have a treaty specifying that their boundary is a river. Suddenly one day there is a flood, and the riverbed changes. The river moves south, over a large expanse of territory. The northern nation claims that the boundary has moved, and therefore the territory of the northern nation has just expanded by a considerable number of square miles. The southern nation agrees that it is the river that delimits the boundary, but it says that there has been a fundamental change of circumstances not contemplated by the parties when they signed the treaty, and therefore it is no longer bound by the treaty. What does Article 62 say about this case? If you were advising the southern nation, would you claim a fundamental change of circumstances? Or would you make a different argument?

**QUESTION 19.** If states party to a treaty were to comply with the treaty only so long as they think it is in their national interest to do so, the treaty might be a rather inconsequential document in international law. Why would a nation continue to comply with a treaty even if the costs of compliance seem to exceed the benefits? Jot down your responses to this question before reading the next article.


QUESTION 20. How can a state violate a human rights treaty? Note that there are basically two kinds of provisions in treaties, which we might call "pledge" provisions and "commitment" provisions. If a treaty says that a party "undertakes to enact legislation to secure the aforementioned rights," or language to that effect, the party has made a pledge to do something. A "commitment" provision, on the other hand, establishes a right in the treaty itself, and there is nothing in the language of the treaty to suggest that anything more needs to be done by the party to recognize such a right. With these two generic types of treaty provisions in mind, please consider carefully Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, quoted previously in this chapter and now quoted again:

**Article 2.**

States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other
appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;

(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination;

(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;

(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise;

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.

QUESTION 21. How can a state violate the above provisions? What proof of violation would you need? When could you be sure that a violation has occurred? What if six months goes by and a party to this Convention does nothing? What if sixty years passes and no “appropriate measures” are ever adopted? Would you have a different set of responses to the following Article from the same Convention?

Article 15.

1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law.

2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.

3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void.

4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile.


You may want to read “The Feminist Critique” now in connection with the previous discussion of gender discrimination. Later, “The Feminist Critique” will be assigned as reading in the Chapter on Critical Perspectives. If you read it now, you may wish to refer to the Questions relating to “The Feminist Critique” that are contained in the Chapter on Critical Perspectives.

FOOTNOTES Chapter 5


2 [ADDITIONAL QUESTION FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION: If the state making the declaration is now in court disputing that it intended to be legally bound, how can the court know that the state intended to be bound? Doesn’t the court’s statement beg the question?]

3 This Article is informally known as the “compatibility rule.” See INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, p. 133.

4 By 1990, 96 states had ratified this Convention; the United States signed it in 1980 but as of 1993 has not ratified it.

5 The principle of “intertemporal law” in the interpretation of treaties is consistent with Article 28. It holds that rules of international law contemporaneous with acts in the distant past, and not present rules of law, control their present legal significance. If this were not the case, many titles to territory that were based on acts of
aggression and wars of conquest would have to be overturned on the basis of present-day law which does not recognize conquest of territory by illegal aggression. For a discussion, see the entry "INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERTEMPORAL PROBLEMS," by Anthony D'Amato, in the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

6 Suppose a party makes the following reservation to a treaty: "Article 99 of the treaty shall not apply to France to the extent that it is incompatible with French internal law." France then proceeds to ignore Article 99 of the treaty. Has France violated Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties?