


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view that he felt that we should conclude the present understanding as speedily as possible, as this would tend to set currents in motion away from aggravation of the present tension.

Mr. Hamilton commented that the view just expressed by the Ambassador in regard to the desirability of arresting trends which lead to an aggravation of international friction was very statesmanlike.

Mr. Hamilton then said that we had been orally informed that the associates of the Japanese Ambassador had mentioned . . . something about Japan's being now willing to withdraw all their troops from China within two years.

The Ambassador replied that he was not conversant with the details of this matter. He observed, however, that Japan's treaty with Wang Ching-wei provided for the retention of Japanese troops in China for defense against Communism during the period of the validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which he said might last only two years, but perhaps much longer.

Mr. Hamilton in conclusion said that we regretted the arising of difficulties in the course of our conversations, but that we thought it desirable when such difficulties arise to discuss them frankly with the Japanese Ambassador and his associates who throughout these conversations have been animated by a sincere desire to bring about better relations with the United States. We also said that we appreciated the frankness which they in turn had consistently manifested in talking with us.

In response to a question by the Ambassador, Mr. Hamilton said that our telegram to Mr. Grew related only to the question of a Japanese attack on Siberia and that we expected a reply. The Ambassador said that he would inform his Government of what we had said.

NOTE: Throughout the conversation, Mr. Hamilton made clear that he was speaking under express authorization from the Secretary.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

740.0011 European War 1939/14615

Statement Handed by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to Mr. Tomohiko Ushiba, Private Secretary of the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), on July 6, 1941

Message Sent by the Secretary of State at the Specific Request of the President for Delivery to His Excellency the Prime Minister of Japan, Prince Fumimaro Konoye . . .

From a variety of sources reports are reaching the Government of the United States that it is the intention of the Japanese Government to enter upon hostilities against the Soviet Union.

As is well known to the Japanese Government, the maintenance and preservation of peace in the area of the Pacific has been the earnest desire of the American Government, which has contributed its greatest efforts to the achievement of that high purpose.

From statements made in recent months by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Admiral Nomura, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, in the course of conversations between them, as well as from the utterances of responsible Japanese officials, the Government of the United States has derived the hope that it was also the desire of the Government of Japan to maintain and preserve peace in the area of the Pacific. The reports which are now reaching the American Government are so completely contrary to those statements and utterances that the Government of the United States finds it very difficult to believe in the truth of those reports.

Should Japan enter upon a course of military aggression and conquest it stands to reason that such action would render illusory the cherished hope of the American Government, which it understood was shared by the Japanese Government, that peace in the Pacific area, far from being further upset, might now indeed be strengthened and made more secure.

It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that the reports of Japan's decision to enter upon hostilities against the Soviet Union are not based upon fact, and an assurance to that effect from His Excellency the Prime Minister of Japan would be deeply appreciated by the Government of the United States.

Tokyo, July 6, 1941.

740.0011 European War 1939/14615

Statement Handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew), on July 8, 1941

Message in Reply Sent by H. I. M.'s Foreign Minister at the Request of the Prime Minister for Delivery to the President of the U. S. A., Dated July 7th, Showa 16 (Translation)

At a time like this all sorts of rumours are abundantly bred not only in Japan but in all countries.

It is hardly necessary to state that the prevention of the European War from spreading to the regions of Greater East Asia and the maintenance and preservation of peace in the area of the Pacific have always been the sincere and genuine desire of the Japanese Government which have consistently contributed their earnest efforts toward achieving that high purpose.

The Japanese Government wish to state, in reply to the last paragraph of the Message, that they have not so far considered the

711.94/2184

Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941

During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a sound basis for negotiations between the two countries relative to the maintenance of peace with order and justice in the Pacific. The principles and policies which were under discussion in these conversations precluded pursuit by either Government of objectives of expansion by force or by threat of force.

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indochina and that they would agree that the markets and raw materials of Indochina should be available to all Powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the Powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the Government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indochina.

Notwithstanding these efforts, the Government of Japan has continued its military activities and its disposals of armed forces at various points in the Far East and has occupied Indochina with its military, air and naval forces.

The Government of the United States is in full sympathy with the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for amicable and mutually profitable relations between our two countries. This Government's patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such an understanding has been demonstrated time and again during recent years and especially during recent months. This Government feels at the present stage that nothing short of the most complete candor on its part, in the light of evidence and indications which come to it from many sources, will at this moment tend to further the objectives sought.

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immedi-

ately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

711.94/2184

*Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese
Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941*

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on August 8 during a conversation with the Secretary of State whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoe and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is made also to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on August 16 that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two Governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

When the Japanese Ambassador brought up these suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the Government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this Government had received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to

acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indochina. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indochina and pointed out that the Government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indochina or the acquisition of military and naval bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

The Government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this Government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this Government and this Government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

that Japanese statesmen ought to understand that we are helping China for the same reason that we are helping Britain; that we are afraid of the military elements led by Hitler. He added that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China were not unlike Hitler's methods. The Ambassador asked how we could save the situation at this juncture. The Secretary replied that he agreed upon the urgent importance of saving it, but he asked whether the Ambassador thought that the Japanese statesmen could tone down the situation in Japan. Mr. Kurusu said, with reference to the fifth point in the Japanese proposal, that he did not know whether his Government would agree but he thought that that point might be interpreted to mean that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that negotiations were started. The Secretary made no comment on that point but noted that in the last few days there had been marked subsidence in warlike utterances emanating from Tokyo, and he felt that it was indeed a great tribute to the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that so much had been accomplished in this direction within a short space of two days as he felt sure that it was their efforts which had brought this about. He said that if so much had been accomplished within the course of two days, much more could be accomplished in the course of a longer period.

No time was set for the next meeting.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2540H

Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 20, 1941

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

711.94/2474

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1941.

Ambassador Kurusu called at my hotel apartment at his request. He had no business to take up with me except to refer to the Japanese interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and handed me a draft of a paper which he proposed to sign by way of attempted clarification. I looked at the paper and then asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more on the whole subject of a peaceful settlement to offer. He replied that he did not. I said that I did not think this would be of any particular help and so dismissed it. This was virtually all that was said of importance.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

*Draft Letter Handed by Mr. Saburo Kurusu to the Secretary of State on November 21, 1941*⁶¹

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: Through several conversation[s] I have had the honor of holding with Your Excellency, I was rather surprised to learn that a deep-seated misconception prevails among your people about the obligation which Japan assumed under the Tripartite Pact.

As Your Excellency is fully aware I am the one who signed the said treaty under the instructions of my Government; and I am very happy to make the following statement which I trust will serve to eradicate the aforesaid false impression:

It goes without saying that this treaty can not and does not infringe, in any way, upon the sovereign right of Japan as an independent state.

⁶¹ Filed separately under file No. 762.9411/323.