

report of strong French support for President de Gaulle's attack on NATO over a year after the quantitative data were in.

Yet even after the condensation of "several thousand pages of typescript, tables, and computer printout" (p. ix), the study more resembles a code and data book than an interpretative analysis. There is little doubt about Deutsch's ability to digest prodigious amounts of data. When presented serially and in such overwhelming detail, however, the task of culling the most important findings from even these predigested data, and grasping their broader significance, becomes a task of heroic proportions. The quantitative responses to question after question leave one with a sense of bewilderment and finally loss in trying to relate back the figures to those given in the previous paragraphs and the preceding chapters.

This is not a criticism that the details shouldn't be filled in but rather that they should be developed within a theoretical framework that makes them interpretable at a higher level of analysis. Because no model of the process of attitude and opinion formation is offered—or even a set of hypotheses that relate responses in different substantive areas to the processes of consensus formation or political integration—the question of how things got the way they are and what their cumulative impact is tend to go unanswered.

This failure to anchor the study theoretically by making the assumptions of the analysis explicit and tracing out their logical implications has repercussions on the validity of some inferences drawn from the data. In one of the few statistical tests reported—that age accounts for less than 10 percent of the variance observed (p. 68)—the inference drawn that present attitudes are likely to persist for some time is simply not a logical consequence in the absence of a model that relates cross-sectional variance explained to longitudinal fluctuations. The conclusion that "the development of . . . a French-German consensus is likely to require far more than ten years, even under favorable conditions" (p. 15) is another unsupported inference from the data; to make such a projection (why not five or twenty years?), what is needed is not only the "broadly based evidence" that Deutsch calls for but a specification of the empirical indicators used to define operationally "consensus" and an analysis of their differential rates of change over time. Finally, the conclusion that the French Fifth Republic is not "a surface phenomenon that will vanish after President de Gaulle" (p. 73) may or may not turn out to be true; the important point is, however, that this inference presupposes a theoretical perspective which is not made explicit: that the influence of the intellectuals and nonbusiness interest groups, who were least willing to give the Republic after

de Gaulle a long lease on life, will not turn out to be significant.

Deutsch is at his best when he steps back somewhat from his data and speculates on the future of the Atlantic Alliance. His plea for a loosened alliance unbridled by United States assertions of hegemony does seem to touch the contours of favorable elite opinion. It is unfortunate that these recommendations spring more from an attempt to surface "trends" in the data than from a theory which Deutsch might have given us and used his data to test (as he has superbly done in earlier studies).—STEVEN J. BRAMS, *Syracuse University*.

Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion. By B. S. MURTY. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 310. \$10.00.)

The encomia with which this book comes readily equipped and packaged are enough to propagandize a timid reviewer before he gets a chance to object. On the front jacket flap Professor Richard Falk says the book is "undoubtedly the most profound and comprehensive study of this important subject yet available," while the back flap echoes in the words of Professor J. B. Whitton that "the present work is superior to anything I have read on the subject." In a glowing foreword Professor Lasswell declares "it is as sure as any prognosis can be that his work will be accepted as the landmark treatise on an elusive topic."

I found it instead an elusive treatise on a landmark topic. Some day, perhaps, a great book might be written on the legal and political questions involved in attempting to regulate the use of propaganda—what Professor Murty calls (throughout the book and rather ponderously) the "ideological instrument of coercion." Even as purely normative political theory, the question of whether, and if so what types of, propaganda should be regulated offers fascinating potential. Although Professor Murty does not shrink from offering prescriptions, his book suffers not only from a basic lack of psychological realism but also from a lack of concrete examples of propaganda that he would allow or disallow in his repeated goal of securing "minimum" world public order.

In the first place, what is propaganda? Professor Murty talks extensively about it in 294 tightly printed pages, but for a central organizing concept the best he can offer is that it is an "ideological instrument of coercion," while the latter term is defined—straight out of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*—as "moral or physical compulsion by which a person is forced to do or to refrain from doing some act apart from his own voluntary action." Leaving out physical compulsion as irrelevant, this leaves us with moral compulsion. That, says Professor Murty, occurs when a person is "subjected

to a high degree of constraint in the choice of alternatives in shaping his conduct." How many alternatives? A "few," says Professor Murty, and those are "attended with expectations of high cost and low gains." (p. 28).

But in what sense are alternatives restricted by propaganda? Are they physically removed? Morally deflected? Are we talking about a recipient of propaganda whose visual horizons become clouded as a result of the insistent message, who sees fewer alternatives than are really there? The housewife who homes in on a particular brand of soup without "seeing" all the others on the supermarket shelves? Or has someone, working with the propagandist, actually removed all the other brands?

And how about conflicting messages? Professor Murty has a large blind spot for the informative effects of conflicting propaganda. Busy with the task of trying to regulate one stream of propaganda, his schemata would probably become too complex if he had to acknowledge that a second stream could neutralize the first. (It's hard for anyone looking at "law" with the evident awe that Professor Murty evinces to say that two wrongs can make a right.)

Clearly a basic problem with the book is lack of specificity—despite the numerous sources and even examples that are cited. Just what image or concept bothers the author? I got the impression that cases such as the Japanese warmongering machine that was in full force in the 1930's is something that the author would like, somehow, to suppress under international law. But there is no detailed study—as might, for example, be undertaken by factor analysis—of the relation between internal propaganda and external aggressive behavior, or even more important, of whether one may infer a causal relationship between propaganda and aggressiveness. Propaganda might be a result rather than a cause, and as such could be useful in alerting other nations to the propagandizing state's intentions.

The author alludes in passing to several studies of the content analysis of propaganda, as he also alludes to gestalt psychology and "Pavlov's conditioning theory" (no mention of Skinner). Content analysis, of course, is not directly relevant to the author's purpose, which is to indicate how propaganda can and should be legally regulated. But an awareness of the numerous levels of commitment, motivation, and cognitive dissonance that research in content analysis demonstrates would have served the author well in his attempt to lay down rules for legal regulation. Rather than simply stating that many of the questions are matters of degree, he would have seen that *the* question is whether any lines can be drawn at all. If Japanese propaganda brought on the second world war, should the United States immediately silence the

John Birch society? From an international law standpoint, how can the other nations force the United States to silence the Birchites? Would such an attempt to force a country to take steps against the freedom of speech of its own citizens itself lead to world war three? Or is propaganda bad only if its emanates (is controlled by?) official sources? What should we have done with Hitler, who constantly preached peace? The author has considerable trouble with the results of the Nuremberg trials which did not hold as criminal any propaganda *per se*. He writes that if Goebbels had been one of the defendants he would not have been acquitted, but the evidence he cites from the trials indicates that a Goebbels conviction would have been based on participation in a conspiracy to initiate a war of aggression and not on his radio broadcasts. Although the author does a commendable job of summarizing the history of propaganda as a concept of international law, his analysis progressively falters as matters are brought up to date.

Professor Murty's heavy reliance throughout on organizing categories derived from the writings of Professor Lasswell gives the book a sense of organization that is not really there. Some chapter headings, for instance, are: "clarification of policy," "audience," "objectives," "situation and capability," "strategies," "outcome," "decision process." These umbrella words overlap all over the place, with the result that matters brought up in "objectives" are repeated in a later chapter called "outcome" and again in the chapter called "decision process." We read the chapter on "audience" only to find that audience has little if anything to do with the analysis. Chapter headings become titles of index-card boxes in which the cards are reshuffled indiscriminately. This is not to blame Professor Lasswell, whose brilliance and acuity if anything transcended his cumbersome terminology in his pioneering works on propaganda and related subjects. Rather, it seems to be a by-product of the main stream of behavioralism these days, which finds in outlying tributaries jargon-infested studies which to the nondiscerning reader cast disrepute on the main stream itself. Professor Murty simply made use of the wrong types of methodology.—ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, *Northwestern University*.

The Common Aid Effort. By MILTON J. ESMAN AND DANIEL S. CHEEVER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 421. \$7.50.)

This book addresses itself to the manner in which Western industrialized countries can more rapidly reduce the well-being gap between themselves and the poverty-ridden nations of the Third World. The authors' main hypothesis is that the North-South "confrontation between the rich and