Schwarz's effort seeks to tell how the revolutionaries saw the revolution—at least in St. Petersburg.

In its place in the History of Menshevism series, his volume does appropriately provide a thorough analysis of the role, and sometimes lack of a role, of Menshevism in 1905. At the same time, it is a history of socialism in 1905 with as many accolades to the Bolshevists as to the Mensheviks. As Schwarz demonstrates from the record of his own activities in 1905, somehow the militant activist tactics of Bolshevism seemed ever so much more relevant to the situation of that year. Schwarz does take issue with Bolshevik historians for distorting both Bolshevist and Menshevist roles in 1905 and particularly feels compelled to reassert the Mensheviks' historic role in creating the Soviet in 1905.

The volume is by no means a literary gem—a flaw that cannot be ascribed to the translator. It is pedantic, at times overly tendentious, and certainly far too generous with long quotations which might well have been shortened, summarized, or even omitted. The research is extraordinarily thorough and the author's grasp of the sources unquestioned. Curiously, there is no bibliography—an astounding omission in a monograph published by a distinguished university press. Schwarz is of no help in explaining the rural violence—for that the scholar must still turn to G. T. Robinson's Rural Russia under the Old Regime—the ministerial crisis, or the ambiguous position of Russian liberals. Schwarz's concern is with the socialists, a concern hitherto abandoned to Soviet historians who are saddled with their own albatrosses. Defects notwithstanding, by providing this intelligent analysis of socialism in 1905, Schwarz has filled a major gap in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement.—Warren Lerner, Duke University.


A decade ago news stories on Vietnam rated no more than page 37 of the New York Times under a Macly's ad; today there is similar unawareness, and similar future headline potential, of the new nations of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Tucked away in southern Africa, these former British High Commission Territories are shown on most atlases and globes under their previous names of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland (only the latter name has not changed, but it did receive its independence after the book under review was published). These countries and the even newer named Namibia (formerly South West Africa) are pawns in a fascinating and desperate gambit by South Africa to insulate itself against attack by the Black African states to the north.

The White minority rulers of South Africa cast their shadow over all these countries. Determined not to desegregate their own country out of fear that even a taste of the "good life" will start South Africa down the "slippery slope" of massive revolution, they intend to use the disenfranchised Black majorities as buffer units against the anti-White nations that dominate the African continent. Internally in South Africa, this program is taking the form of "Bantustans"—quasi-autonomous Black enclaves forming worker pools for "border industries" located in the White areas surrounding the Bantustans. Externally, South Africa hopes that Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland will become de facto Bantustans. The delicate policy appears to be to keep these Bantustans from becoming politically or economically independent, but also to give them enough of a stake in their own growing, dependent economics that they would not become allied with military or sabotage movements from the north. To do this, South Africa has to extend some economic aid, primarily infrastructural, to these enclaves so that they will have a degree of stability, be able to be easily policed, and become efficient sources of daily migratory labor. So far, South Africa's economic overtures and political gestures appear to have achieved some success, inasmuch as there seems to be no overt hostility to South Africa in these territories. Thus they may be on their way toward becoming buffer states in the true sense of that word. On the other hand, quite out of control of South Africa, guerrilla movements and hopeless but harassing border attacks against South Africa and Rhodesia are occurring with increasing frequency.

Against this strategic backdrop is an exceptionally fertile field for scientific political analysis. Are the new Bantustans viable new national units? What degree of integration are they achieving internally? What degree of integration may be found in the entire complex of nations in southern Africa? Is there a rudimentary "common market," as South Africa would desire? How many international "transactions" can be discerned, indicating the degree of reliance of the new nations on South Africa's economy? What is the proportion of imports to GNP? How are the guerrilla movements financed and supported? What is their local, as well as external symbolic significance? How do the United Nations' sanctions against Rhodesia influence the position of the former High Commission territories, and Namibia, against both Rhodesia and South Africa? These are questions not only of the greatest theoretical importance, but of potentially the greatest practical importance as well. By utilizing recent scientific and hard-data techniques developed in the discipline, political scientists are
presented with a unique opportunity to apply their theories and methods to an area that will surely become the focus of world attention.

It is extremely ironic, therefore, that hardly any one at present seems to be taking up the challenge. Certainly the book under review does not even make a nod in these directions. There is no work, to the present reviewer’s knowledge, dealing with integration and transactional analysis of the southern African countries. African Study centers seem to exclude this entire area from their main concern. Yet it is here where these centers, drawing upon interdisciplinary methods in political science, sociology, linguistics, and anthropology, among others, can apply their theories in a practical crucible. For example, the problems of political culture, nationalism or integration, linguistics (South Africa’s new policy of instructing Blacks in their prescientific Native languages), political development, and so forth, here acquire an immense practical importance in an area that is soon destined for radical change.

The most that can be said for the book under review is that it has chosen an important topic. Otherwise, it is simply a “current history” approach to political science, highlighting willy-nilly those topics that appear in local newspapers and government reports—party histories, political personalities, names, dates, legal movements, economic plans, inventories of natural resources. Missing are the more significant factors of integration and nationalism, guerrilla movements, South African strategy, the policies of Zambia and Rhodesia, the Bantu concept, transactional economic analysis, and related topics. To an extent, of course, the authors could make the hoary rejoinder that they did not choose to write about these things, and that they cannot be criticized for not writing a different book. However, it might be said by way of reply that they raise expectations by their title that are not fulfilled. And perhaps more importantly, their own conclusions are not proven by the evidence they adduce. Professor Stevens’ most important conclusion is that the United Nations and Great Britain should furnish considerable economic aid to these territories so that “South Africa can be prevented from using these Territories as hostages in her conflict with the rest of Africa.” But he has not shown what sense of the term “hostages” he means or whether any definition of such a term would be correct in his conclusion. Indeed, South Africa’s policy might well be to use these lands as willing allies, and not at all as “hostages,” and to this extent may itself be providing them with considerable economic aid. Perhaps by extending aid, the United Nations is simply lifting a burden from South Africa. Or perhaps not; maybe aid is desirable for other reasons.

But to make a judgment on this issue, Professor Stevens would have to consider the problem from a much more complex strategic viewpoint than the recounting of facts, names and dates. His present work amounts to little more than three good encyclopaedia articles under the headings of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.—ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, Northwestern University.


The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949 resolved that “the political parties participate in the forming of the political will of the people”, that “they may be freely formed”, that “their internal organization must conform to democratic principles”, and that “they must publicly account for the sources of their funds” (Art. 21,1). The Basic Law further stipulated that “details will be regulated by Federal legislation” (21,3). Eighteen years and some five abortive legislative proposals later, the Bundestag finally acted on this mandate and passed a “Law on the Political Parties” in the summer of 1967 (Gesetz über die politischen Parteien [Parteiengesetz] vom 24. Juli 1967, Bundesgesetzesblatt I, 1967, No. 44 of July 27, 1967, pp. 773–781). After the processes of nominating candidates for public elections had previously been regulated by electoral legislation, and after the Federal Constitutional Court had already interpreted, and effectively applied (in the cases of the SRP and the KPD), the Basic Law’s principles on the unconstitutionality of certain political parties, the debate preceding the legislation of 1967 had primarily focused on the following issues:

1) The publicity of the parties’ revenues and financial transactions (cf., for an excellent recent survey, Rupert Breitling’s article on “Literatur zur Partei- und Wahlfinanzierung”, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 9 [1965], pp. 99–120, as well as the 1963 special issue of the Journal of Politics, edited by Rose and Heidenheimer); 2) Financial and other support from public sources for parties’ election campaigns and related activities (cf. Heinrich Christian Jülich, Chancengleichheit der Parteien, Berlin 1967); 3) The internal organization of the political parties, especially with regard to the legitimization of party leadership and the democratic nature of their internal policy-making processes.

After Ulrich Lohmar (Innereparteiliche Demokratie, Stuttgart 1963) had provided an earlier study on the subject, Ute Müller’s book is one of the last contributions to the debate on this third issue to have appeared prior to the Parteiengesetz of 1967. On the basis of the constitutional provision that the political parties’ internal organization “must conform to democratic principles,” she